In the case of Pfc. Bradley Manning, who is accused of releasing classified information to WikiLeaks, the government presented a motion during court proceedings today to prevent the defense from discussing “harm” or lack of “harm” done by leaks in its case.
The government’s motion (which no member of the press will ever get to personally read because these proceedings do not have that kind of transparency) argued Judge Col. Denise Lind should not let the defense raise the issue of harm until the sentencing portion of the trial because “actual harm or damage” is “not relevant” and lack of harm is “not relevant to any defense available.”
Maj. Ashden Fein argued “no element” of the charges against Manning require “actual damage to be proven.” He added: “Whether the accused knew or thought he knew which documents and information would cause actual harm to the United States is irrelevant to his specific acts for which he is charged.”
Fein invoked the case of Matthew Diaz, a lieutenant commander based at Guantanamo Bay who was accused of committing an unauthorized disclosure when he mailed a cut-up list of detainees at the prison to the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) in a Valentine’s Day card. Diaz was convicted in a court martial and his thoughts were, according to Fein, found to be “irrelevant” to the “mailing of information.”
The issue of “damage assessments” was also raised. The defense thinks this material is “relevant on merit.” But, the government does not think his “personal decisions on whether he thought a document would be classified” is relevant to the charges either. He was a “junior analyst,” not an “original classification authority (OCA).” He had no “authority” to make a decision to release the material nor did he bother to consult an OCA before providing the material (allegedly) to WikiLeaks. And, also, Fein said whether or not damage occurs today or tomorrow does not mean that some day there will not be “harm” from the unauthorized release.
Manning’s defense attorney, David Coombs, in arguing for the motion to be denied, stated the motion is “premature.” The defense has not “had the benefit of seeing damage assessment reports.” The “government has seen them” but has “fought vigorously to not provide” them to the defense. It is “difficult to argue relevancy on material we have not been able to see at this point.”
He reminded the court that the government has “repeatedly” said “damage assessment reports” probably would “show harm but will not let” the defense see the reports. This conduct leads the defense to believe these reports would show there was “no harm or very little harm.” Documents the defense has seen so far supports this claim. And, “when you look at fact alleged acts occurred over two years” ago and widely known no harm pointed to that public is aware of, it leads the defense to believe the reports would be “beneficial.”
Coombs then appeared to introduce an argument on Manning’s alleged acts that had not been fully aired in court yet: he suggested Manning was “selective in what he disclosed.” He had numerous documents at his fingertips. Only a few sets of documents were released, ones he “believed could not do damage to the US.”
“Manning had access to a great deal of information that undoubtedly could cause harm to US,” Coombs declared. Since he was “charged with having reason to believe that information could be used to injure US,” the “defense should be able to argue he knew which documents could be used to injury of the US” or against the country by foreign nations.
Coombs suggested the government wants to prevent the defense from discussing in open court whether “something could cause damage.” The government is “going to show classification and training.” The defense, he said, “should be able to look at classification and training to say he actually could select information that would not cause damage.” This would go to the issue of “overclassification, the fact that we classify a lot of stuff that should not be classified.”
Additionally, “the government must still be required to prove it was potentially damaging or useful.” It “does not get a free pass on establishing whether information by classification alone could cause damage or aid any foreign nation.”
Another aspect at issue here would be that discussion of “harm” would be “relevant to impeachment.” Not being able to raise “harm” means an OCA could testify on a database, claim improperly that it had references to “sources” and the defense would have issue cross-examining the OCA to challenge his or her claims.
Not surprisingly Fein came back and argued “it is not an individual soldier or anyone in the federal government’s” right to “make a decision” on whether a document or record should be classified or not.
Fein held up a document and acted out a scenario.
If this document was classified today and no one disputed it. Today, I am holding this document and then tonight I was to give to enemy of the US and it constitutes intelligence and I was to steal and commit a regulation violation…Knowing what I know today and then tomorrow no damage occurred, that somehow no damage occurred is somehow relevant to whether some time today I had classified documents that I had no authority…
…Tomorrow’s effect is relevant at the time of commission of the crime and what government is arguing is any damage that comes after requires mens rea therefore is irrelevant to actual charges and should be precluded to merits, not sentencing.
Coombs came back and bluntly said the “fact government does not believe actual harm is relevant on merits is interesting but is wrong.” It is “interesting” the “government would box in such way. What better proof than actual damage?” Why wouldn’t they want to argue that “at time of release not only could it cause damage but we now know it caused a lot of damage?
“That they would box themselves in indicates there is [or was] minimal damage,” Coombs concluded.
Essentially, the government is conceding there is no harm as a way to prevent the defense from viewing government records that likely show there was no harm found by agencies that did investigations. It is purely aimed at concealing what the government failed to uncover and prevent them from being exposed for shouting, “The sky is falling! The sky is falling!” hysterically when the releases by WikiLeaks posed absolutely no threat to US national security whatsoever.
Then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates claimed Afghan war logs would cause “significant harm.” (Later, he said there was “little harm” from the release.) Congress was warned of the potential for the release of US diplomatic cables to do harm. McClatchy reported officials were “overstating” danger posed by WikiLeaks releases. The hysteria, however, worked. It convinced Americans that WikiLeaks “harmed public interest” and did not contribute information that was of public interest. They decided WikiLeaks editor-in-chief deserved to be arrested.
Now that one to two years has passed and the government has no basis for their hysteria, this is their strategy, to advance a ploy that prevents the public from finding out the truth of what resulted in the aftermath of Manning’s alleged leaks.




13 Comments

Dylan Ratigan just had David House on his show, and really had great discussion about it, Kevin…! I’ll see if I can find a link to it…!
Here’s the MSNBC linky…
Thanks for the update, Kevin.
Wanting to stifle soldiers from speaking out about government corruption and horrific policies for fear of “aiding the enemy” is a feature not a bug.
Kevin, I love reading your updates on the Issues you are covering.
It would be helpful for those of us, who want to follow stories here but can’t read ever aricle on this issue, to summarize the intent of the process.
What happened today.
Just say it.
Thanks, as always, Kevin for your insightful coverage.
Far too few citizens are aware of this travesty of justice and human nature, but the few that do know about Pfc Bradley Manning tend to believe the propoganda lies about him… mainly that he was this huge giant “threat” to US security, and anyway: no whistleblowing is permitted.
Terrible.
We are all curious who does make these decisions. That is secret also. The four million members of the Top Secret Cult spy on us and torture and assassinate anyone they want. Four million members of SIRPNet means SIRPNet has been compromised a long time ago. The
US Government assisted espionage, by creating Stuxnet malware.
But who decides what is secret? President Obama said he does not make those decisions.
The live blog is a quick round up of what happens each day and less detailed than analysis posts like this.
Thank you Kevin. I look forward to all you post. There is none better that i have found.
Harm can’t be an issue because there was none, or little, except to reputations.
BIDEN: I don’t think there’s any damage. I don’t think there’s any substantive damage, no. Look, some of the cables that are coming out here and around the world are embarrassing. I mean, you know, to say that, you know, for you to do a cable as an ambassador and say I don’t like Biden’s tie, he doesn’t look good and he’s a homely guy, that’s not something —
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40702904/ns/msnbc_tv-andrea_mitchell_reports/
SecDef Gates: “fairly modest”
“I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer and so on,” Gates told reporters at the Pentagon last week. “I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. . . . Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120303267_2.html?sid=ST2010120303076
And the info went to the world.
A former senior intelligence official said that over the past decade access to Siprnet has ballooned to about 500,000 or 600,000 people, including embassy personnel, military officials from other countries, state National Guard officials and Department of Homeland Security personnel. That is partly in response to calls for data-sharing and partly because agencies such as the State Department wanted a way to communicate classified information without going to the expense of setting up their own network, said the former official, requesting anonymity because Siprnet’s size and uses are considered a sensitive matter.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/28/AR2010112804138_2.html?sid=ST2010112802494
And the wide dissemination “obviously. . .went too wide.”
SEC. GATES: One of the common themes that I heard from the time I was a senior agency official in the early 1980s in every military engagement we were in was the complaint of the lack of adequate intelligence support. That began to change with the Gulf War in 1991, but it really has changed dramatically after 9/11.
And clearly the finding that the lack of sharing of information had prevented people from, quote/unquote, “connecting the dots” led to much wider sharing of information, and I would say especially wider sharing of information at the front, so that no one at the front was denied — in one of the theaters, Afghanistan or Iraq — was denied any information that might possibly be helpful to them. Now, obviously, that aperture went too wide. There’s no reason for a young officer at a forward operating post in Afghanistan to get cables having to do with the START negotiations. And so we’ve taken a number of mitigating steps in the department. I directed a number of these things to be undertaken in August.
First, the — an automated capability to monitor workstations for security purposes. We’ve got about 60 percent of this done, mostly in — mostly stateside. And I’ve directed that we accelerate the completion of it.
Second, as I think you know, we’ve taken steps in CENTCOM in September and now everywhere to direct that all CD and DVD write capability off the network be disabled. We have — we have done some other things in terms of two-man policies — wherever you can move information from a classified system to an unclassified system, to have a two-person policy there.
And then we have some longer-term efforts under way in which we can — and, first of all, in which we can identify anomalies, sort of like credit card companies do in the use of computer; and then finally, efforts to actually tailor access depending on roles.
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4728
But, agencies intended to find some evidence of “harm” and went into overdrive asking agencies/departments for details on the impact. Biden and Gates’ statements are good but they should not obscure this fact.